Doctor of Economics
Professor of Management Science
Game Theory and Contract Theory
Fields of Interest
Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Strategic Behavior,Coordination Problem
- “Finitely Repeated Games with Monitoring Options,” (with Tadashi Sekiguchi), Journal of Economic Theory. Vol. 148, pp. 1929?1952.
- “The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 139, pp.192-221, 2008. (with Eiichi Miyagawa and Tadashi Sekiguchi)
- “Repeated Games with Observation Costs”（co-authored with Tadashi Sekiguchi,Eiichi Miyagawa), Discussion
Paper No. 0203-14 Columbia University, 2003.
- “Principal-Multiagent Relationships with Costly Monitoring,”
Discussion Paper No.2002.26, Kobe University, 2002.
- “Coalition-Proof Sharing Rule in Partnerships,” mimeo. 2001.