Doctor of Economics
(Kobe University)

URL

Title

Professor of Management Science

Specialized Fields

Game Theory and Contract Theory

Fields of Interest

Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Strategic Behavior,Coordination Problem

Current Research

• “Finitely Repeated Games with Monitoring Options,” (with Tadashi Sekiguchi), Journal of Economic Theory. Vol. 148, pp. 1929?1952.
• “The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 139, pp.192-221, 2008. (with Eiichi Miyagawa and Tadashi Sekiguchi)
• “Repeated Games with Observation Costs”（co-authored with Tadashi Sekiguchi,Eiichi Miyagawa), Discussion
  Paper No. 0203-14 Columbia University, 2003.

• “Principal-Multiagent Relationships with Costly Monitoring,”
  Discussion Paper No.2002.26, Kobe University, 2002.

• “Coalition-Proof Sharing Rule in Partnerships,” mimeo. 2001.